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Abstract— Determining possible failure scenarios is a critical
step in the evaluation of autonomous vehicle systems. Real
world vehicle testing is commonly employed for autonomous
vehicle validation, but the costs and time requirements are high.
Consequently, simulation driven methods such as Adaptive
Stress Testing (AST) have been proposed to aid in validation.
AST formulates the problem of finding the most likely failure
scenarios as a Markov decision process, which can be solved
using reinforcement learning. In practice, AST tends to find
scenarios where failure is unavoidable and tends to repeatedly
discover the same types of failures of a system. This work
addresses these issues by encoding domain relevant information
into the search procedure. With this modification, the AST
method discovers a larger and more expressive subset of the
failure space when compared to the original AST formulation.
We show that our approach is able to identify useful failure
scenarios of an autonomous vehicle policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Validation of autonomous vehicles (AVs) is a critical and
challenging task that needs to be addressed to ensure the
safety of human drivers and vulnerable participants such as
pedestrians. AV validation remains difficult due to the wide
variety of driving scenarios that need to be handled by the
AV. While real world vehicle testing is commonly used for
validation, the costs and time requirements are extremely
high [1]–[3]. Even with simulation, the space of driving
scenarios is too expansive for naive sampling techniques to
adequately cover. Various adaptive sampling approaches have
been explored [4]–[7].
One adaptive simulation-based technique for autonomous
system validation is Adaptive Stress Testing (AST) [8]. AST
involves finding the most likely failures of a system by
formulating the search through the space of scenarios as a
Markov decision process (MDP) and applying reinforcement
learning (RL) methods to find a solution. The reward function
of the MDP depends on whether the autonomous system
experiences a failure (i.e., a vehicle collision), and the
likelihood of state transitions. This reward formulation has
two issues:
1) AST finds scenarios where failure is unavoidable (e.g.
a pedestrian causing a collision with a stopped AV).
2) AST tends to repeatedly discover failures that are
similar to ones that it already found.
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These outcomes are unhelpful for engineers and policy mak-
ers who want to find a variety of different failure scenarios
where the autonomous vehicle should have behaved differ-
ently. This work seeks to address these issues by modifying
the reward function. We incorporate heuristics related to
autonomous driving to guide the search algorithm toward
the most relevant failures.
We employ two approaches to help find the most informa-
tive failures of an autonomous driving scenario using AST.
To address the first issue, we incorporate the Responsibility-
Sensitive Safety (RSS) policy into the reward function [9].
RSS is a formal, mathematically interpretable model to char-
acterize autonomous vehicle safety. By incorporating RSS
into the reward function, we help guide AST to find scenarios
where the vehicle behaved improperly prior to a collision.
To address the second issue, we incorporate a dissimilarity
metric that encourages the discovery of failures that are
highly distinct from one another. These reward modifications
allow AST to produce a wider range of failures that are of
greater interest when compared with results obtained using
the existing AST reward function.
We present the following contributions:
1) We propose a framework to extend AST for au-
tonomous vehicle validation through reward augmen-
tation to better identify relevant failures.
2) We present two augmentation techniques that can be
used with the AST method. The first uses the RSS
framework to identify specific instances of improper
AV behavior. The second incorporates a dissimilarity
metric to find multiple, unique modes of failure involv-
ing the AV.
3) We apply AST with an augmented reward on a sce-
nario involving an autonomous vehicle and pedestrians
and show the effectiveness of our methods in finding
relevant failure cases when compared with an existing
AST setup.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II provides
an overview of the AST method and how it is applied to
an autonomous vehicle scenario, as well as the RSS rule
set. Section III presents the reward augmentation methods
for RSS and the dissimilarity metric. Section IV describes
several experiments and their results. Lastly, Section V
provides concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides the necessary background for un-
derstanding how AST is used with an autonomous driving
scenario, as well as the relevant rules of RSS.
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A. Adaptive Stress Testing
Adaptive stress testing is a validation technique that frames
the problem of validating an autonomous policy (referred to
as system-under-test or SUT) interacting with an environ-
ment as a Markov decision process. Various reinforcement
learning algorithms can then be applied to find the most
probable failure modes of the SUT. AST has successfully
been applied to aircraft collision avoidance systems [8], [10]
and autonomous driving policies [11]. The AST method is
detailed below with an example of an autonomous driving
policy being validated for collision avoidance.
AST requires a simulator S of the SUT interacting with
an environment and a set of possible actions A. For example,
the SUT could be an autonomous driving policy controlling
a car that is approaching a busy intersection. The action
space of the environment could include, for example, the
pedestrians’ accelerations, the friction coefficient of the road,
the trajectories of other cars, and the amount of sensor noise
in the perception system. The user of AST defines a set of
critical states E that are failures of the autonomous policy. In
the driving example, E may contain all states of the simulator
where the AV has approached too close to, or collided with,
another agent.
The simulator can be a black-box system that does not
make its internal operation and state available to AST, but it
must expose the following interface:
• Initialize(S ): Resets simulator to a starting state.
• Step(S , a): Steps the simulation forward in time by
taking action a. Returns a flag indicating if the new state
of the simulator is in E.
• IsTerminal(S ): Checks whether the current state of
the system is in the critical set E.
AST operates using the simulator S , a reward function, and
an RL solver. The solver generates environment actions that
are used to update S . Once in its new state, S checks
if a critical state has been reached or if the simulation has
reached its maximum duration, then passes that information
to the reward function. The reward function then generates
a reward and passes it back to the solver.
The AV scenario under study is based on the work of
Koren, Alsaif, Lee, et al. and is shown in Fig. 1, where
an autonomous vehicle approaches a crosswalk where one
or more pedestrians is attempting to cross. The SUT is
the autonomous vehicle controlled by the Intelligent Driver
Model (IDM) — an algorithm that keeps the vehicle in its
lane, following the traffic ahead while maintaining a safe
distance [12]. The goal of the vehicle is to identify the
pedestrians crossing the road and apply adequate braking to
avoid coming too close. The state of each agent is represented
by a 4-tuple:
sagent = (vx, vy, x, y)
where (vx, vy) represents the agent’s velocity and (x, y)
represents the agent’s position.
AST has control over pedestrian acceleration and the noise
in the AV’s sensors. In particular, the action space associated
with the ith pedestrian is represented by a 6-tuple:
Fig. 1. Autonomous vehicle crosswalk scenario [11].
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(n
(i)
vx , n
(i)
vy ) is the sensor noise corresponding to the agent’s
velocity, and (n(i)x , n
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y ) is the sensor noise corresponding
to the agent’s position. The noise components are processed
at each time step and added to the vehicle’s observation of
each pedestrian’s position and velocity. Actions are sampled
by the AST solver from a uniform distribution where the
acceleration values are between [-1,1] and noise values are
between [0,1].
The reward function is defined as follows:
R (s) =

0 s ∈ E
−α− βD(rv, rp) s /∈ E, t ≥ T
−M(a | s) s /∈ E, t < T
(1)
where D(rv, rp) is the Euclidean distance between the au-
tonomous vehicle and the pedestrian and M(a | s) is the
Mahalanobis distance of the action a given the current state s,
which is related to the log probability of that action [13]. The
constants α and β are set to 10 000 and 1000, respectively,
to penalize the algorithm for not finding a collision. Solvers
used in our application include Monte Carlo Tree Search
(MCTS) [14] and Trust Region Policy Optimization (TRPO)
[15] because both have been shown to successfully find
failures when combined with AST [8], [11].
B. Responsibility-Sensitive Safety
Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS) is a set of driving
rules motivated by common-sense driving practices that,
when all agents on the road follow them, produce a driving
utopia where no collisions will occur [9]. It is unrealistic
to assume that all drivers will follow these rules exactly at
all times, but RSS can help us formalize the responsibility
of each party involved in an accident. RSS designates an
agent as responsible for an accident if it did not follow the
rules governing a proper response when the driving situation
became unsafe. A response is determined to be proper if it
is permitted by the RSS rules.
For the purposes of this work, a subset of RSS rules
are selected, specifically those concerned with longitudinal
and lateral collision avoidance. Consider two agents on
the road c1 and c2 with longitudinal velocities v1 and v2.
If the response time, maximum possible acceleration, and
maximum possible braking of the agents is known, then the
minimum safe distance between them can be derived from
simple kinematic relationships [9]. If the agents are moving
in the same direction, then the minimum safe longitudinal
distance between them is given by:
d =
[
v1ρ+
1
2
aaccmaxρ
2 +
(v1 + ρa
acc
max)
2
2abrkmin
− v
2
2
2abrkmax
]
+
(2)
where [x]+ = max(x, 0), ρ is the agents’ response time,
aaccmax is the maximum allowed longitudinal acceleration of
either vehicle, abrkmin is the minimum longitudinal braking
required to avoid a collision, and abrkmax is the maximum
longitudinal braking possible by a vehicle. If c1 and c2
are moving toward one another (with c2 having a negative
velocity), then the safe longitudinal distance is given by:
d =
v1 + v1,ρ
2
ρ+
v21,ρ
2abrk,1min
+
|v2|+ v2,ρ
2
ρ+
v22,ρ
2abrk,2min
(3)
where v1,ρ = v1 + ρaaccmax and v2,ρ = |v2|+ ρaaccmax.
A driving situation is considered longitudinally dangerous
if the distance between c1 and c2 is less than the safe
distance d. Let tlongd be the time at which a situation
first becomes longitudinally dangerous, then a longitudinal
proper response is one that adheres to the following rules:
1) In the pre-response interval [tlongd , t
long
d +ρ], cars may
accelerate toward each other by no more than aaccmax.
2) During the response time (t > tlongd +ρ), c1 must brake
at least as hard as −abrkmin until reaching a safe situation
and then can have any non-positive acceleration.
3) During the response time, if c2 has positive velocity,
then it cannot brake harder than −abrkmax. If c2 has
negative velocity then it must brake at least as hard
as −abrkmin. Once a safe situation is reached, any non-
negative acceleration is allowed.
A similar analysis can be done in the lateral direction.
Assuming that c1 is to the left of c2, then the minimum safe
lateral distance is:
d =
[
v1 + v1,ρ
2
ρ+
v21,ρ
2abrkmin
− v2 + v2,ρ
2
ρ+
v22,ρ
2abrkmin
]
+
(4)
where velocities and accelerations are now defined for the
lateral direction. A situation is considered laterally danger-
ous if the lateral distance between two agents is less than the
safe lateral distance. Let tlatd be the time at which a situation
becomes laterally dangerous, then a lateral proper response
requires adherence to the following rules:
1) In the pre-response interval [tlatd , t
lat
d +ρ], the cars may
accelerate toward each other by no more than aaccmax.
2) During the response time (t > tlongd + ρ), c1 and c2
must each brake laterally at least as hard as abrakemin to
bring their lateral velocity toward 0. After reaching a
lateral velocity of 0, c1 can have any non-positive lat-
eral acceleration and c2 any non-negative acceleration.
Finally, we can combine these rules into a single rule
for basic obstacle avoidance. Let td be the first time that
a situation is both laterally and longitudinally dangerous. A
proper response for agents c1 and c2 is as follows:
1) If td = t
long
d , then c1 and c2 employ a longitudinal
proper response.
2) If td = tlatd , then c1 and c2 employ a lateral proper
response.
Using this formulation, we can classify the actions of
an agent as either proper or improper at any timestep in
the simulation. Figs. 2 and 3 show an example interaction
between a vehicle and a pedestrian that results in a collision.
These simulations are a re-creation of the scenario shown in
Fig. 1. In these plots, the vehicle moves from left to right and
the pedestrian moves from right to left. The scenario ends in
a collision where the pedestrian collides with the front corner
of the car. Figure 2 shows timesteps that are colored based
on category of danger (longitudinally dangerous, laterally
dangerous, or both), while Fig. 3 shows colors indicating
if the AV is behaving properly. The driving situation starts
out laterally dangerous and only becomes longitudinally
dangerous as the pedestrian gets close to the car. The car
applied strong braking to miss the pedestrian. Its behavior
is classified as proper with respect to the vehicle at every
timestep, despite the trajectories ending in a collision.
Fig. 2. Example trajectory with the danger classification at each timestep.
Fig. 3. Example trajectory with autonomous vehicle response classification
at each timestep.
III. METHODS
This section outlines two reward augmentation approaches
used on AST. The first uses RSS classification of proper and
improper behavior and the second uses a dissimilarity metric
of state trajectories that end in a failure.
A. RSS Rewards
We define fimp as the fraction of timesteps considered
improper by RSS for the state trajectory of the autonomous
vehicle. The set of critical events E is altered to only include
events that result from trajectories where the AV has behaved
improperly. Let τ be a sequence of actions applied to the
simulator and define:
ERSS = {τ | τ ∈ E and fimp(τ) > fcrit} (5)
where 0 ≤ fcrit < 1 is a tunable parameter that governs how
many timesteps the vehicle has behaved improperly before
it is considered at fault. The RSS reward function is then
given by:
RRSS (s) =

0 s ∈ ERSS
−α− βfimp(τ) s /∈ ERSS, t ≥ T
−M(a | s) s /∈ ERSS, t < T
(6)
where we replaced the Euclidean distance metric D with a
metric that depends upon the fraction of timesteps that are
improper in that trajectory. We are making the assumption
that trajectories that have a higher fraction of timesteps
where the autonomous vehicle behaved improperly are more
likely to end in a collision. For RSS to classify an action
as improper, a collision must already be imminent, and the
vehicle is not appropriately resolving the situation.
B. Trajectory Dissimilarity (TD) Rewards
Suppose τ1 and τ2 are the spatial trajectories of two agents
(possibly of different lengths) represented by a sequence of
points in R2 such that τ1 = {p11, p21, . . . , pi1} and τ2 =
{p12, p22, . . . , pj2}. We first normalize the lengths of both
trajectories by dividing each trajectory into n trajectory
segments such that each segment contains a consecutive
sub-sequence from either τ1 or τ2. For each segment, a
representative cix : i ∈ [1, n] is then calculated by computing
the center of mass of the segment [16]. The trajectories are
now expressed as a sequence of these representative points
such that τ ′1 = {c11, c21, . . . , cn1} and τ ′2 = {c12, c22, . . . , cn2}.
The dissimilarity measure D(t1, t2) between the trajectories
τ1 and τ2 is defined as follows [16]:
D(τ1, τ2) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
‖ci1 − ci2‖2 (7)
where n is a predefined constant denoting the number of
trajectory segments chosen when normalizing.
The reward function is then modified as follows
RTD (s) =

γ
µ
∑µ
i=1D(ts, ti) s ∈ E
−α− βD(rv, rp) s /∈ E, t ≥ T
−M(a | s) s /∈ E, t < T
(8)
where γ is a user tunable parameter that controls the extent
with which the solver is rewarded for discovering highly
diverse failure scenarios. We define µ as min(k, k′) where
k is a user provided constant that specifies the number of
top failure trajectories (ordered by total reward) that AST is
asked to return and k′ is the number of failure trajectories
that AST has already found. D(rv, rp) andM(a | s) remain
unchanged from the generic AST reward function.
TABLE I
RSS PARAMETERS WITH g = 9.8m/s2 AND ρ = 0
aaccmax a
brk
min a
brk
max
Lateral 0.1g 0.05g −
Longitudinal 0.1g 0.7g 0.7g
IV. EXPERIMENTS
This section describes the experiments of the RSS and
dissimilarity reward augmentation on the AV scenario. The
software setup used to run the experiments is based on the
Adaptive Stress Testing Toolbox1.
A. RSS Reward Experiments
The RSS reward augmentation was applied to the AV
scenario with a single pedestrian and solved using the
TRPO algorithm [15]. TRPO trains a control policy for
the environment that produces events with high likelihood
of collision. The policy is then sampled for 1000 action
sequences and those that ended with a collision between
the car and the pedestrian were recorded. Action sequences
were recorded for the generic AST algorithm and the RSS-
augmented version. The RSS parameters shown in Table I
were chosen to approximate plausible accelerations of an
autonomous vehicle and pedestrian. A response time of
ρ = 0 was chosen because the SUT simulation has no in-built
delay. For industrial applications, these parameters should be
chosen with care, as they will affect the types of failures
discovered by AST.
Figure 4 shows the aggregate results of the two trials.
Without the RSS reward augmentation, the most common
type of failure involves vehicle trajectories where the vehicle
is not at fault, and a much smaller number of trajectories are
found where the AV policy is to blame. For the RSS reward
function, all trajectories have a non-zero fraction of improper
timesteps, and in most trajectories, the AV policy behaved
improperly for more than 25% of the simulation timesteps.
Fig. 4. Distribution of trajectories over fraction of improper response for
the generic AST reward function and the RSS reward function.
Two representative trajectories were selected from two
policies. Fig. 5 shows a trajectory from the generic AST trial
1https://ast-toolbox.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
where the pedestrian collides with the side of the car as it
drives by. The car slows down as the pedestrian approaches,
but because the pedestrian is encroaching laterally, the vehi-
cle behaves properly by maintaining a zero lateral velocity.
The trajectory from the RSS-augmented trial is shown in
Fig. 6 which shows that the vehicle entirely fails to stop
when the pedestrian walks out in front of it. This failure
is due to sensor noise and results in a much more relevant
failure mode than the previous example. The trajectory shows
that the vehicle behaved improperly in the last quarter of its
trajectory and is clearly to blame for this collision.
Fig. 5. Example trajectory with the generic AST reward.
Fig. 6. Example trajectory with RSS reward augmentation.
B. TD Reward Experiments
The following experiments are conducted using a two ve-
hicle and two pedestrian test case adapted from the scenario
discussed in Section II-A. The vehicles drive on a single lane
road and approach a crosswalk. One pedestrian is placed on
either side of the crosswalk and they attempt to cross the
road. The goal of the vehicles is to avoid coming too close
to either pedestrian and each other. The set of failure states
E is set include all states s where:
1) Longitudinal (x) or lateral (y) positions between the
lead car and any pedestrian is less than 0.5 meters.
2) Longitudinal (x) position between the two cars is less
than 0.5 meters.
Initial conditions are shown in Table II.
Figure 7 shows all failure trajectories found after running
AST without reward augmentation using an MCTS solver. In
this setup, the results show a strong bias towards a particular
scenario where the lead vehicle stops well ahead of the
crosswalk and a pedestrian then moves too close to the
vehicle, causing the failure (pedestrian induced). Table III
shows the number of various failure types found using AST.
TABLE II
STARTING STATE OF EACH PEDESTRIAN AND VEHICLE
vx (m/s) vy (m/s) x (m) y (m)
Pedestrian 1 0 0.5 0 −3
Pedestrian 2 0 −0.5 0 3
Car 1 11.1 0 −20 0
Car 2 12.5 0 −37 0
TABLE III
NUMBER OF FAILURES OBTAINED USING AST
Failure Type Generic Reward TD Reward
Vehicle/Pedestrian
(Vehicle Induced) 0 4
Vehicle/Pedestrian
(Ped. Induced) 25 15
Vehicle/Vehicle 0 6
We see that without reward augmentation, AST discovers and
returns a single type of failure. The results demonstrate the
drawbacks of using this baseline version of AST for failure
detection in autonomous vehicle systems. While the method
is able to identify the maximum required number of failures
(25 in this case), the results lack diversity and converge to
one failure mode. Furthermore, this mode lacks relevance as
it identifies a scenario where the pedestrian runs towards a
stopped vehicle; a situation that is unavoidable by the car.
Fig. 7. Trajectories returned with generic AST reward (two pedestrian/two
car scenario).
Figure 8 shows failure trajectories found using AST with
trajectory dissimilarity reward augmentation and an MCTS
solver that is run for the same number of iterations as the
above case. By incorporating the dissimilarity metric, the
solver is able to explore a larger subset of the failure space.
Table III shows that the trajectories obtained now consist of
other failure modes in addition to the pedestrian induced
ones discovered using the generic AST reward function.
The green trajectories in Fig. 8 indicate cases where the
lead car fails to apply adequate braking and approaches too
close to a pedestrian within the crosswalk region (vehicle
induced vehicle/pedestrian failure), while the red crosses
indicate failure cases where the second vehicle follows too
Fig. 8. Trajectories returned with TD reward augmentation (two pedes-
trian/two car scenario).
closely with the lead vehicle (vehicle/vehicle failure). Both
cases may indicate possible vehicle policy shortcomings
and show that when compared with generic AST, trajectory
dissimilarity reward augmentation allows for the discovery
of relevant weaknesses of this AV policy.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed two reward augmentation methods
that allow Adaptive Stress Testing to be more suitable for
autonomous vehicle validation. We showed the limitations
of the current AST method in finding relevant failure cases
and its tendency to repeatedly converge on single failures.
By augmenting the reward function in AST with domain
relevant information from RSS and trajectory dissimilarity,
we showed that we were able to discover a more diverse
set of failures. In the case of RSS rewards, the AST method
found trajectories with a high percentage of improper vehicle
responses, while with trajectory dissimilarity rewards, AST
found trajectories with high failure diversity. Our results
indicate that with reward augmentation, AST is able to
find more useful failures that can aid in the validation of
autonomous vehicles. With these modifications, we suggest
that AST can be used as an efficient simulation based tool
to find relevant weaknesses in an AV policy. Future work
will involve incorporating these two reward augmentation
methods into a single reward framework to discover a diverse
set of failures with improper vehicle responses.
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